



































There is little empirical evidence on the eect of minimum wage increases on prices,
particularly for developing countries. This paper estimates this eect using monthly
Brazilian household and ﬁrm data over 18 years. As minimum wage increases in Brazil
are large, frequent and aect a sizable fraction of the labor force, they aect aggregate
prices. Because of this expected price eect, rational agents may take such increases
as a signal for future price and wage bargains. Indeed, robust results indicate that the
minimum wage raises overall prices not only on the month of the increase, but also in
t h et w om o n t h sb e f o r e .
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Despite much eort to reconcile the available empirical evidence with the theoretical predic-
tion of disemployment following a minimum wage increase (Neumark, and Wascher, 1992;
Williams, 1993; Card and Krueger, 1995; Brown, 1999; Machin et al., 2003), few attempts
have been made to test the theoretical prediction that such an industry wide cost shock will
be passed through to prices. With small employment responses becoming prevalent in the
literature (Freeman, 1996; Brown, 1999), higher prices are an obvious response to minimum
wage increases. Nonetheless, there has been little empirical evidence on the minimum wage
price eect in the international literature (Card and Krueger, 1995; Aaronson, 2001; Machin
et al., 2003), and none for developing countries. Lemos (2004b) surveyed this (mainly US)
literature and concluded that a 10% increase in the minimum wage raises food prices by
no more than 4% and overall prices by no more than 0.40%. However, this evidence might
not carry out to other developed and developing countries, and further empirical evidence
is urged.
This paper’s main contribution is to provide this much needed evidence. The eect of
minimum wage increases on prices is estimated using Brazilian household and ﬁrm data over
a fairly long 18 years period with extensive variation on the minimum wage. In Brazil, not
only are minimum wage increases large and frequent — unlike the typically small increases
studied in most of the literature — but also the minimum wage binds on a sizable fraction
of the labor force. Consequently, these nominal wage shocks have an important impact on
aggregate price movements. Because of this expected price response, rational agents may
take nominal minimum wage increases as a signal for future price and wage bargains. It
is then not surprising that even when wage shocks are sizeable, employment eects can be
small (Lemos, 2004a; Neumark et al., 2003; Carneiro, 2002).
Indeed, the evidence here indicates that the minimum wage raises overall prices not only
on the month of the increase, but also in the two months before. Minimum wage indexation
and reinforced inﬂationary expectations was a phenomenon ﬁrst noticed by Gramlich (1976)
and Cox and Oaxaca (1981), and more recently discussed by Card and Krueger (1995) and
Freeman (1996). The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the data. Section 3 discusses the empirical equation (Section 3.1), discusses identiﬁcation
(Section 3.2), presents the results (Section 3.3) and performs robustness checks (Section
23.4). Section 4 concludes.
2 Data and Descriptive Analysis
The minimum wage data shows that coverage of the minimum wage legislation in Brazil
is full. There are no dierentiated minimum wage rates for speciﬁc demographic groups,
labor market categories or regions. Figures 1 and 2 show the nominal and real minimum
wage between 1982 and 2000 (the timing of the ﬁve stabilization plans, discussed below,
are indicated in the horizontal axis). The real minimum wage fell over time because of its
impact on both inﬂation and the public deﬁcit.
First, the minimum wage has often triggered a wage-price inﬂation spiral in Brazil.
That is because after the dictatorship installed in 1964 associated high inﬂation with wage
adjustments, the nominal minimum wage was systematically held constant and used as a
deﬂationary policy, via erosion of the real minimum wage. Conversely, nominal minimum
wage increases were inﬂationary, as rational agents have often taken such increases as a
signal for future price and wage bargains — even after law forbade its use as numeraire in
1987. Minimum wage indexation and reinforced inﬂationary expectations was a phenomenon
ﬁrst noticed by Gramlich (1976) and Cox and Oaxaca (1981), and more recently discussed
by Card and Krueger (1995) and Freeman (1996). Maloney and Mendez (2004) show that
the indexer and numeraire eects are a general phenomenon in Latin America. Second,
the minimum wage has often aected the uncontrollably large and growing public deﬁcit in
Brazil via beneﬁts, pensions and the public sector wage bill. As a result, the ﬁscal impact
of the minimum wage has been a constraint to the size of the increase.
With the end of the dictatorship in 1985, nominal minimum wage adjustments were
subject to the rules of ﬁve dierent stabilization plans. This resulted in the saw-toothed
pattern observed in Figure 2: nominal minimum wage increases were large and frequent,
but quickly eroded by the subsequent inﬂation. For example, in early 1986, the nominal
minimum wage was increased by 15% and bi-annually adjusted initially, but then adjusted
whenever inﬂation was higher than 20%. Despite of that, the real minimum wage was 25%
lower in mid 1987 than it was in early 1986. The nominal minimum wage was then initially
frozen for three months before it was indexed monthly by past inﬂation. In early 1989, it was
3again frozen, and in mid 1989 it was again indexed monthly. In early 1990, the real minimum
wage was 45% lower than it was in early 1989. In late 1991, the nominal minimum wage was
again monthly indexed. In 1993, adjustments were bi-monthly and then monthly. In early
1994, adjustments were made daily, which did not prevent the real minimum wage from
falling to 40% lower in mid 1994. In mid 1995 the nominal minimum wage was increased
by 42%, and since then it has been annually adjusted.
The wage data is from PME (Monthly Employment Survey), a rotating panel data for
six Brazilian metropolitan regions (Salvador, Recife, Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, Sao
Paulo and Porto Alegre) between 1982 and 2000, similar to the US CPS (Current Population
Survey). The data was aggregated across regions and across months.
The price data is the Consumers Price Index (IPC) across the same six metropolitan
regions. Figure 3 shows that the pattern of IPC and of the nominal minimum wage in
dierences is remarkably synchronized, with a raw correlation of 0.55; this synchronized
pattern was also documented for the US (Aaronson, 2001). Although consumer price indices
suer from several drawbacks to study price responses (Poterba, 1996), they have been used
in the exchange rate, sale taxes, and minimum wage price pass through literature (Poterba,
1996; Card and Krueger, 1995).
The remaining cost and productivity data is from PIM (Monthly Industrial Survey) and
SONDA (Industrial Survey) aggregated across the same six metropolitan regions. The inter-
est rate data is from BACEN (Brazilian Central Bank). All data is available from the IBGE
(Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) and FGV (Getulio Vargas Foundation).
3 Empirical Speciﬁcation and Identiﬁcation
3.1 Empirical Speciﬁcation
The large empirical literature on the price response to industry wide shocks — such as
sales taxes, exchange rates (Poterba, 1996; Goldberg and Knetter, 1997) and more recently
minimum wage (Aaronson, 2001) — commonly uses the inverse of the proﬁt maximizing
condition under imperfect competition as the theoretical grounding for the empirical price







where S is prices, F is costs and e is the price elasticity of demand. Approximating this
theoretical equation by a logarithmic function and modeling time and regional ﬁxed eects
using dummies, the following reduced form empirical equation is obtained:
lnSlw =  + )lnFlw + il + iw + ylw
where for region i and time t: il is regional ﬁxed eects; iw is time ﬁxed eects; and ylw
is the error term. As the main components of costs are wages (and minimum wage) and
interest rate, these are used as empirical measures of costs. In addition, a measure of power
consumption cost and a measure of productivity are included. The new equation is:
(1) lnSlw =  +
PO
o=n olnPZwo + lnZlw + ulw + lnHlw + lnDlw +
PP
p=1 plnSlwp + il + iw + zlw
where PZw is nominal minimum wage; Zlw is average of nominal wages; ulw is real in-
terest rate, deﬁned as the national nominal interest rate minus regional inﬂation; Hlw is
industrial power consumption; Dlw is the total industrial production divided by total num-
ber of workers directly employed in production in the metallurgic industry; and zlw is the
new error term. Assuming that the static speciﬁcation is valid at each period, two forms of
dynamics are allowed: lags and leads of the shock variable are included to allow the eect
of the minimum wage on prices to be complete; and lags of the dependent variable are in-
cluded to account for lagged adjustment in prices due to the inability to adjust other inputs
instantaneously to minimum wage increases. The number of lags and leads is an empirical
matter and is discussed in Section 3.3.
The starting place is an ad hoc speciﬁcation where  and 0 only are allowed to be
nonzero in Equation (1). Then Equation (1) is estimated using two dierent production
functions, Y=f L(L) and Y=f LK(L,K),w h e r eL is labor and K is capital. Assuming that
labor is the only variable factor in the long run is equivalent to constraining the coe!cients
of the real interest rate ( ) to zero. All models in the paper are sample size weighted to
5account for the relative importance of each region (and for heteroskedasticity arising from
aggregation), and also corrected for serial correlation across and within regions, assuming
an autoregressive process speciﬁct oe a c hr e g i o n . 1
3.2 Identiﬁcation
Because the nominal minimum wage is constant across regions in Brazil, it cannot be used
as the shock variable in Equation (1). “Kaitz index” is the shock variable commonly used in
minimum wage studies, deﬁned as the ratio of the minimum wage to average wages adjusted
for coverage of the legislation (Kaitz, 1970). Although “Kaitz index” varies across regions,
the variation in average wages is what drives the variation in the ratio. As a result, the
eect of the inverse of average wages on prices is what would ultimately be estimated (Welch
and Cunningham, 1978). Another shock variable commonly used in minimum wage studies
is “fraction aected”, deﬁned as the proportion of workers earning a wage between the
old and the new minimum wage (Card, 1992). Card and Krueger (1995) and Spriggs and
Klein (1994) used “fraction aected” in their price equations for the US. However, “fraction
aected” is constant when the nominal minimum wage is constant, and does not capture
the erosion of the later in relation to other wages and prices.
A variable closely related to “fraction aected” is “fraction at” the minimum wage,
deﬁned as the proportion of workers earning one minimum wage (Dolado et al., 1996) (plus
or minus 0.02%, to account for rounding approximations). “Fraction at” is conceptually
related to “fraction aected” but does not suer from the same drawback, as it can be
deﬁned even when the minimum wage is constant. Beyond statistical identiﬁcation, “fraction
at” is a measure of wage (price) inﬂation and thus well suited to study minimum wage price
eects. Its correlation with the real minimum wage and the Kaitz index in the sample period
is respectively 0.61 and 0.67.
1An alternative reduced form empirical price equation can be delivered by a simple general equilibrium
model, assuming perfect competition in the input and output markets, where price is modeled as a function
of minimum wage, real interest rate, capital stock, labor supply shifters and aggregate demand shifters.
The results in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 were robust to this alternative speciﬁcation. Card and Krueger (1995)
argue that assuming perfect or imperfect competition in the output market makes little dierence for the
purposes of estimating the eect of an industry wide shock such as minimum wage increases on prices and
employment.
6Thus, to ensure identiﬁcation of the eect of the minimum wage on prices, “fraction
at” replaces log nominal minimum wage in Equation (1). To reﬂect a 10% increase in the
minimum wage, all estimates in the paper are multiplied by 0.6, which is the approximate
elasticity of “fraction at” with respect to the minimum wage.2 Card and Krueger (1995)
interpret their “fraction aected” estimates in a similar manner.
3.3 Results
Panel A of Table 1 shows positive and signiﬁcant WLS  estimates, which are robust across
speciﬁcations. The estimate using the ad hoc speciﬁcation suggests that a 10% increase in
the minimum wage raises prices by 0.02%. This is robust when using the more complete
speciﬁcations (see column 1 of Panel A), whether or not the real interest rate is controlled
for, i.e. whether assuming Y=f LK(L,K) or Y=f L(L).
Columns 2 and 3 of Panel A show that the anticipated eects of the minimum wage
on prices are signiﬁcant. Two leads of the shock variable immediately before the month of
the minimum wage increase are signiﬁcant; further leads were not statistically dierent from
zero. A 10% increase in the minimum wage raises prices by 0.03% (0.02%) one month before
the increase, and by 0.02% (0.02%) two months before, when controlling (not controlling)
for the real interest rate. The long run eect is 0.07% (0.06%).
Column 4 of Panel B of Table 1 shows that lagged eects of the minimum wage on prices
are not signiﬁcant. In addition to the two leads included in Panel A, one lag of the shock
variable immediately after the month of the increase was included. Neither the ﬁrst nor
further lags were statistically signiﬁcant. The estimates are now marginally larger and more
robust when the real interest rate is not controlled for, but unchanged when it is controlled
for, both in the short and long run. This suggests that all adjustment in prices in response to
minimum wage increases happen in the two months leading up to the increase and no lagged
adjustments follow the increase. To test this further, a dierent form of lagged dynamics
was allowed. Panel C of Table 1 shows that some lagged prices response might be captured
2The 0.6 estimate is the coe!cient of the nominal minimum wage on a regression of “fraction at” on
the dierence of log nominal minimum wage and the other regressors in Equation (1). However, because
the nominal minimum wage does not vary across regions in Brazil, the Kaitz index (using not only average
wage, but also median wage as the denominator) was used instead. The 0.6 estimate was remarkably robust
across speciﬁcations.
7when two lags of the dependent variable are included. The estimates are now smaller when
the real interest rate is not controlled for, but once again unchanged when it is controlled
for in the short run. In the long run, the estimates are larger and more robust; they are
0.10% (0.08%) when controlling (not controlling) for the real interest rate.
Even though the rapid wage-price spiral in Brazil discussed in Section 2 suggests shorter
dynamics, other factors such as the minimum wage indexer and numeraire roles, and long
inﬂationary memory in Brazil might perpetuate the minimum wage eect on prices over
time, even though all models include time and region ﬁxed eects to account for unusually
high inﬂation periods. Aaronson (2001) included lags and leads in his speciﬁcations and
found that most of the prices response occurs in the two month period immediately after a
minimum wage increase, while the remainder occurs in a two month window around this.
They argue that these are short dynamics for the US and that they are due to the fact that
minimum wage changes do not generate the sort of coordination failure and stickiness in
prices that other costs or demand shocks produce.
The preferred speciﬁcation is the one including both leads of the shock variable and
lags of the dependent variable, as well as controlling for the real interest rate (second row
of Panel C of Table 1). First, this speciﬁcation allows for two dierent forms of dynamics
to account for anticipated and lagged price adjustments in response to minimum wage
increases. Second, the estimates are more robust when controlling for the real interest rate,
suggesting that the minimum wage variable is picking up some of the negative eect of
the real interest rate on prices when Y=f L(L) is assumed. Using this speciﬁcation, a 10%
increase in the minimum wage raises prices by 0.02% in the month of the increase, and by
0.08% after accounting for a two month window around the increase for anticipated and
lagged adjustment in prices. Incidentally, the other speciﬁcations produce similar results,
which is reassuring that the estimates are not too sensitive to whether or not the interest
rate is held constant and to whether or not lagged dynamics are allowed.
3.3.1 Are Price Eects Small in Brazil?
The 0.08% price eect above is in line with theory and with previous empirical evidence on
overall price eects in the international literature ranging from 0.20% to 0.40% (Sellekaerts,
1981; MacCurdy and McIntyre, 2001), which use US data and an entirely dierent method-
8ology. Nonetheless, this result is smaller than that in the literature and smaller than that
expected for Brazil. That is because in Brazil, not only are minimum wage increases large,
frequent and aect a sizable fraction of the labor force, but also the minimum wage has
been used as numeraire and as indexer (see Section 1). This deserves two considerations.
First, although small, this is a robust eect. Not only is the eect of other common
macro shocks, the eect of regional speciﬁc growth trends, and the eect of the interest rate
separated from the eect of the minimum wage on prices; but also anticipated and lagged
price adjustments are accounted for following a minimum wage increase. This is quite a
demanding speciﬁcation, in which most of the variation in prices is explained by dynamics,
region and time ﬁxed eects. Thus, conﬁdence is great that the remaining variation in prices
really is due to minimum wage changes — all estimates are consistently signiﬁcantly dierent
from zero and thus did not happen due to chance alone.
Second, although these eects are small when compared to the eects in the literature,
they can amount to quite sizeable inﬂation eects in Brazil. For example, the average
minimum wage increase over the sample period was 31%, suggesting that minimum wage
increases, on average, raised overall prices by 0.25% after accounting for a two month widow
of price adjustments around the increase (see column 5 of Panel C of Table 1). Another
example is that the average (largest) cumulative increase within the year in the sample
period, without accounting for compound eects, was 135% (360%). This suggests that, on
average across years, overall prices increased by 108% solely in response to minimum wage
increases after accounting for a two month widow of price adjustments around the increase.
3.4 Robustness Checks
3.4.1 Further Identiﬁcation Strategies
Although the speciﬁcations discussed in Section 3.3 control for region speciﬁc growth trends
and for common macro shocks that could be confounded with the eect of the minimum
wage on prices, they do not control for regional shocks correlated to changes in the mini-
mum wage and wages or prices. To account for this, Equation (1) is modiﬁed to include the
interaction of “fraction at” with the 20wk percentile of the log nominal wage distribution.
This is a measure of the change in the wage of low paid workers across regions caused by
changes in variables other than the minimum wage. That is because the minimum wage
9variable — recall that “fraction at” is the proportion of workers earning one minimum wage
(see Section 3.2) — can be aected by both minimum wage changes and by other regional
variable changes. Thus, including a variable to control for changes in wages of the low paid
across regions separates the eects of regional shocks from the eect of the minimum wage
(on the wages of low paid and thus) on prices. That way, in addition to controlling for region
speciﬁc growth trends and common macro shocks, regional shocks are now also controlled
for. The new equation is:
(2) lnSlw =  +
PO




lw + lnZlw +
ulw + lnHlw + lnDlw +
PP
p=1 plnSlwp + il + iw + xlw
where, Ilw is “fraction at”, Z20
lw is the 20wk percentile of the log nominal wage distribu-
tion and xlw is the new error term.
Panel D of Table 1 shows positive and signiﬁcant WLS  estimates, which are comparable
to estimates in Panel A of Table 1. The estimates controlling for the real interest rate are
virtually the same, which is very reassuring of the previous results. The 
IZ estimates
are not statistically dierent from zero. An alternative speciﬁcation, replacing the 20wk by
the 10wk percentile of the log nominal wage distribution in Equation (2) produced results
qualitatively similar, although a little less robust. Equation (2) is a demanding speciﬁcation
and the results are remarkably robust. Thus, the main conclusion from previous sections
that the minimum wage raises overall prices in Brazil is maintained.
3.4.2 Low Inﬂation
A further robustness check is to re-estimate Equation (1) excluding the high inﬂation period
prior to July of 1994. Panel E of Table 1 shows that the minimum wage does not aect
overall prices in Brazil when inﬂation is low. The change in the magnitude and signiﬁcance
of the estimates is quite dramatic, even though all speciﬁcations in Section 3.3 included
time and region ﬁxed eects to account for the unusually high inﬂation periods. This
suggests that ﬁrms are more able to adjust prices following a minimum wage increase in an
environment of high inﬂation. It also suggests that agents no longer anticipate the increase,
and that the minimum wage is no longer used as numeraire a n di n d e x e ri nl o wi n ﬂation
10periods (see Section 2). This is in line with the evidence found by Aaronson (2001) that
the high inﬂation in the 1970s and 1980s partially drives the positive minimum wage price
eect in the US and Canada. Weiss (1993) argues that price adjustments dier in countries
that have experienced low and high inﬂation.
In summary, minimum wage increases signiﬁcantly increase overall prices in Brazil. This
eect is larger in the long run when anticipated and lagged adjustments have taken place
and thus the minimum wage eect on prices is complete. When inﬂation is high the eect
is also larger when (a) ﬁrms are more able to pass the higher labor costs through to prices
associated to minimum wage increases; and (b) agents anticipate minimum wage increases
and take such increases as a signal for future wage and price bargains. These ﬁndings
are robust across a number of speciﬁcations. They are in line with theory and with the
international empirical literature.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper ﬁlls a gap in the literature by providing new evidence on the price eects of the
minimum wage using household and ﬁrm data for a long 18 year period for a key developing
country, Brazil. In Brazil, not only are minimum wage increases large and frequent but
also the minimum wage binds on a sizable fraction of the labor force. Consequently, these
nominal wage shocks have an important impact on aggregate price movements. Because of
this expected price response, rational agents may take nominal minimum wage increases as
a signal for future price and wage bargains.
Indeed, the evidence here indicates that the minimum wage raises overall prices not only
on the month of the increase, but also in the two months before. A 10% increase in the
minimum wage raises prices by 0.02% in the month of the increase and by a further 0.02%
in each of the two months leading up to the increase. After accounting for anticipated and
lagged adjustments in prices during a two month window around the increase, overall prices
rise by 0.08%. This result is remarkably robust to various identiﬁcation strategies and is
thought to capture the eect of the minimum wage on prices over and above other changes
in the economy that might have happened together with the minimum wage change.
Although in line with theory, this is small when compared to the 0.20% to 0.40% eect
11in the international literature. If overall price eects are small in a country where minimum
wage increases are large and frequent, where the fraction of the labor force aected is large,
and where the minimum wage has been used as numeraire and indexer, then this suggests
that the minimum wage has a concrete policy potential to alleviate inequality and poverty
without undesirable side eects.
A fruitful avenue for future research is to estimate price eects for industries overpopu-
lated by minimum workers in Brazil. That is the usual strategy in the US literature, which
concentrates on the food industry. Estimates for low wage industries are not available for
Brazil, and aggregate estimates might have diluted more positive price eects aecting such
industries.
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Figure 1 - log NOMINAL MINIMUM WAGE
years (stabilization plans indicated)






Figure 2 - log REAL MINIMUM WAGE
years (stabilization plans indicated)




Figure 3 - log NOMINAL MINIMUM WAGE AND log PRICE IN DIFFERENCES
years (stabilization plans indicated)
 nominal minimum wage  price
Jan 82 Feb 86 Jun 87 Jan 89 Mar 90 Jul 94 Jan 00
-.004621
.90445619
Table 1 - EFFECT OF A 10% MINIMUM WAGE INCREASE ON PRICES
models first lead second lead first lag lr
coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(A) BASE SPECIFICATION
ad hoc 0.02 0.01
Y=fL(L) 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.02
Y=fLK(L,K) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.02
(B) ADDING RHS LAGGED DYNAMICS
Y=fL(L) 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.03
Y=fLK(L,K) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.03
(C) ADDING LHS LAGGED DYNAMICS
Y=fL(L) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.03
Y=fLK(L,K) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.03
(D) INTERACTING THE MINIMUM WAGE VARIABLE WITH THE 20th PERCENTILE OF THE WAGE DISTRIBUTION
Y=fL(L) 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.02
Y=fLK(L,K) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.02
(E) LOW INFLATION PERIOD
Y=fL(L) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
Y=fLK(L,K) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
(a) The dependent variable is the difference of logs of prices.  The shock variable is the "fraction at".
(b) Time effects are modeled with month dummies, region effects are modeled with region dummies; cost shifters
     are included as controls, depending on which of two production functions are used, Y=fL(L) or Y=fLK(L,K).
(c) Panels A to E show estimates of "fraction at", its leads and its lags, for respectively a base specification, and specifications allowing for RHS lagged 
     dynamics, LHS lagged dynamics, interaction with the 20th percentile of the wage distribution, and using a low inflation period subsample.
(d) These are GLS estimates, where the weights are the squared root of the inverse of the sample size.  Standard errors are corrected for serial 
    correlation across and within regions (assuming an autoregressive process specific to each region).
(e) Column 1 shows coefficient estimates for static models, columns 2 to 4 show respectively the contemporaneous, leads and lags coefficient 
    estimates for dynamic models, and column 5 shows long run coefficient estimates associated to columns 2 to 4.  The interaction term is not significantly 
    different from zero in all specifications and is therefore not reported here.
(f) To reflect a 10% increase in the minimum wage, the estimates and standard errors were multiplied by 0.6, which is the  
    approximate elasticity of the minimum wage with respect to "fraction at". 